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The History of the T went y-First- Century
Chinese Nav y
Bernard D. Cole

C

hina historically has been a continental rather than a maritime power, despite its more than eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than six
thousand islands. It has more often viewed the sea as a potential invasion route
for foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for achieving national goals, a
tendency that has contributed to the weakness of the Chinese maritime tradition. This attitude had changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The remarkable growth of China’s economy beginning in the last two decades of
the twentieth century, the broadening of Beijing’s global political and economic
interests, and resolution of almost all border disputes with its many contiguous
neighbors have contributed to increased attention
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to “uphold China’s unity and security.” This new strategy and direction marked
the PLAN’s transition to the post–Cold War world.
The four historical missions listed by President Hu Jintao in 2004 were the
traditional responsibility of ensuring the military’s loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security, to include preventing Taiwanese separatism; and the new responsibilities
of safeguarding expanding national interests, including maritime security and
“nontraditional security problems,” and helping to ensure world peace. The
PLAN was being described as “a strategic service” by 2008.1
The navy’s commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, addressed his service’s missions
and intentions at its sixtieth-anniversary review, in 2009. He called for strengthened logistics and support facilities “to improve far-sea repair, delivery, rescue
and replenishment capacities” while establishing “a maritime defense system . . .
to protect China’s maritime security and economic development.” These remarks
reinforced Wu’s 2007 call for creation of a “powerful armed force on the sea” as a
“long cherished dream for the Chinese nation.”2
Imperial China
Despite China’s historical dependence on ground forces to guard its national
security interests, the PLAN can trace its lineage back through the dynasties.
The earliest recorded naval battle in China occurred in 549 bc, during the Spring
and Autumn Period, when rival rulers used ships to attack each other.3 Largescale naval operations continued to play a role in Chinese warfare through the
Han dynasty (206 bc–ad 220). Chinese sea-goers were the first to control their
ships with sails and rudders, employ compartmentation, paint vessels’ bottoms
to inhibit wood rot, and build dry docks. They developed the art of navigation
to a high degree, including use of the portable compass as early as 1044.4 China
had established regular commercial sea routes to southwestern Asia and western
Africa by the end of the Tang dynasty (ad 907).5
The Song Dynasty
The high point of naval developments in imperial China probably occurred during the Song dynasty (ad 960–1279), as part of a five-hundred-year period when
China deployed “the world’s most powerful and technologically sophisticated
navy.”6 During this time, the military organized in times of emergency fleets
composed of several hundred warships and supply vessels. One Song fleet in ad
1274 reportedly totaled 13,500 ships.7 Chinese maritime technology also matured
during this age; shipping was an important part of the national economy.
Perhaps most significantly, the Song regime was the first in China to establish
a permanent national navy, functioning as an independent service administered
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by a central government agency. The Imperial Commissioner’s Office for the
Control and Organization of the Coastal Areas was established in 1132 to supervise a navy of fifty-two thousand men.8
The Song experience was based on a rapidly expanding national economy,
with a particularly strong maritime sector encompassing commerce, fisheries,
and transportation. As the navy expanded, so did port facilities, supply centers,
and dockyards; soldiers were trained specifically as marines, and coast-guard
squadrons were established. Song navies used both sail and paddle-wheel-driven
craft, the latter powered by laborers on treadmills. Doctrine was formalized,
and it included the development of formation maneuvers, long-range projectile
launchers, and complex tactics.9
China remained a sea power during the two succeeding dynasties. In fact,
the overthrow of the Song regime by the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty resulted in
significant part from the latter’s conduct of naval warfare. The Yuan later used
large fleets to undertake invasions of Vietnam, Java, and Japan. The 1274 expedition against Japan, which proved unsuccessful, involved nine hundred ships and
250,000 soldiers; that of 1281 included 4,400 ships.10 Maritime commerce continued to expand, and cannon made their appearance on board ship.11
The Ming Dynasty
During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) China saw both the pinnacle of its overseas naval deployments and the collapse of its naval power. The crux of the successful Ming struggle to succeed the Yuan was a series of battles on the lakes of
the Yangtze River valley. The waterborne forces employed by the Ming and their
opponents were not independent navies but rather army units assigned to ships
on the local lakes and rivers. Their original mission was to transport men and
supplies, but the armies quickly recognized the advantages of using these craft as
warships, against both land forces and each other. The Ming ships were manned
by about twelve thousand troops and were armed with archers, cannon, and
“flame weapons.” The “lake campaign” was an effective use of ships and men to
take advantage of battlefield topography but did not result in the establishment
of a regular Ming navy.
The early-fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He to the Middle East and
Africa also occurred during the Ming dynasty. They demonstrated a standard
of Chinese shipbuilding, voyage management, and navigation well beyond
European capabilities. Zheng He led large fleets of ships, some displacing over
four hundred tons, on seven voyages halfway around the world at a time when
Portuguese explorers were still feeling their way down the west coast of Africa in
fifty-ton caravels.
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After just thirty years, the Ming rulers deliberately ended these voyages for
domestic financial, political, and ideological reasons, just at the time when European nations were beginning to use the high seas to achieve economic wealth
and to proselytize. Why were these expeditions ended? First, the voyages were
expensive, and the Ming pursued a rigid economic policy. Second, the ruling
circle was concerned about the growing power of the court eunuchs, who were
the voyages’ chief sponsors. Third, “Confucian-trained scholar-officials opposed
trade and foreign contact on principle.”12
Perhaps most importantly, however, the threat from Mongols and other Asian
aggressors was growing stronger, which both increasingly focused government
concerns inland and absorbed a growing portion of the national budget. By 1500,
“anti-commercialism and xenophobia [had] won out,” and the government thereafter attempted to deal with maritime problems by ignoring them. The navy was
allowed to deteriorate; by the end of the sixteenth century the Ming government
was unable even to defend its maritime traders against pirates.
During its long period of brilliant maritime scientific progress and dominating power, however, China’s national security concerns had focused not at sea
but on the north and west—with good reason, since that was where the threat
to the regime lay. No dynasty fell as a direct result of maritime invasion or pressure: usurpers emerged from the Asian interior, and the crucial battles were land
fights. The navy was at various times capable and even powerful, but never was
it vital to a dynasty’s survival, even in the face of the centuries-long threat from
Japanese “pirates,” as the Chinese habitually called their neighbors.
The Qing Dynasty
Typical of the process of dynastic progression, the Qing (Manchu) dynasty replaced the Ming in 1644 after a long period of land warfare in which naval power
played a very small role. The Qing made no concerted effort to rebuild the navy
or expand the maritime sector of China’s economy following their assumption of
power. The Qing regime faced no significant threat from the sea during its first
century and a half in power, and there seemed little justification for investing in
a modern navy. This was especially true after the most notable Qing maritime
campaign, when after several failed attempts it conquered Taiwan in 1683.
Overseas trade grew despite Qing indifference, owing in part to the extensive
settlement of “overseas Chinese” throughout Southeast and South Asia that had
begun during earlier dynasties. The Qing navy remained powerful enough to
prevent coastal piracy from getting out of hand, to maintain order on the canals
and rivers, and to perform other coast-guard functions. China had fallen so far
behind the global norm in naval power, however, that it was unable to defeat the
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century imperialists—who came by sea.
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Failed Modernization
As the Qing reeled from the imperialist onslaught and from the effects of the Tai
ping Rebellion, which ended in 1864, major “restoration” movements occurred
in China. These “self-strengthening” efforts, under the slogan “Chinese learning
as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use,” included building and training a modern navy. This facet of modernization probably resulted
from admiration of the technology represented by a modern warship and from
the fact that the imperialist powers had used their navies to impose humiliating
defeats on China.
An arsenal was established in Shanghai to build steam-powered gunboats, but
efforts to modernize China’s navy too often fell victim to Confucian traditionalists, who were the rigid ideologues of the day; it was in part a case of ideology
defeating professionalism, a problem that has persisted. Nonetheless, by 1884
China had deployed a modern navy, led by the efforts of Li Hongzhang, one of
the most prominent of the scholar-bureaucrats who appreciated how far behind
the foreign powers China had lagged. Li used three approaches to build the new
navy, which he thought should be oriented toward coastal defense: indigenous
production, purchases abroad, and the reverse engineering of foreign systems.
Unfortunately, the new navy suffered from high-level governmental corruption and weak administration.13 It was organized into four fleets that were essentially independent navies. The Beiyang Fleet, organized by Li Hongzhang, was
the most modern and powerful; by 1884 it included two 7,500-ton-displacement,
German-built battleships. The Fujian Fleet was homeported in Fuzhou; the other
two fleets were the Nanyang and Guangdong.
This new navy was well regarded by Western observers but soon became
embroiled in battle with two foreign fleets, one of them Western. Disputes with
France over its colonization of Vietnam led to the outbreak of hostilities in August 1884; Chinese ground forces did well, but the local French fleet attacked the
Chinese Fujian Fleet in Fuzhou Harbor and sank every ship.14 China’s other fleets
were not sent to fight the French; Li wanted to conserve and build up remaining
naval strength. His efforts were successful on paper, including establishment of
a national Navy Office, a better-organized training regimen and shore establishment, and in 1888 standardized naval regulations.15
Despite these achievements, China’s navy failed to become a coherent national
force; its most powerful fleet came to grief attempting to halt Japanese incursions
into Korea in the 1890s. The Beiyang Fleet—of two battleships, ten cruisers, and
two torpedo boats—lost a sea battle to the Japanese in September 1894 and withdrew to Weihaiwei, a strongly fortified harbor on the northern Shandong coast.
In January 1895 the Japanese landed troops who seized the Chinese batteries
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guarding the harbor and turned their guns on the Chinese ships.16 The Beiyang
Fleet was eviscerated by its losses in ships, in conjunction with the suicides of
the fleet commander and other senior officers.17 Again, the other Chinese fleets
failed to join the fight.
These naval conflicts with the French and the Japanese demonstrated that
while Beijing had acquired the ships and weapons of a modern navy, it had failed
to institute effective central administration, training, logistical and maintenance
support, or command and control. Furthermore, operational doctrine was almost
completely lacking; the navy’s leaders failed to establish interfleet coordination,
exercises, or mutual support. Finally, China had failed to provide its new navy
with a coherent strategy tied to national security objectives. China’s attempt to
deploy a modern navy in the late nineteenth century failed miserably as a result
of these factors.
The Republic of China (1911–1949)
During the Republican period, Chinese naval forces under Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalists and the Kuomintang Party (KMT) relied almost entirely on ships
leftover from the Qing or obtained from foreign nations. No significant efforts
were made to rebuild the navy, given China’s general political and economic
disarray. Individual warlords occasionally made effective use of maritime units,
but their ships were employed to augment ground forces, which was how navies
had traditionally been employed by Chinese leaders. The low point was probably
reached during the height of the warlord period, in the middle to late 1920s,
when a Western observer dismissed the Chinese navy as a serious force:
There has been a steady deterioration in the discipline of the Chinese Navy since the
establishment of the Republic, and it has now ceased to exist as a national force, the
different units being under the control of various militarists, who treat the vessels as
their own private property. . . . It is impossible today to obtain a complete list of Chinese warships, showing to which party or militarist faction they belong. Vessels have
18
been changing their allegiance . . . with bewildering frequency.

The government did not develop a maritime strategy, since the primary threats
to the new regime were on the ground, from the CCP and warlords. Naval actions
that did occur took place chiefly on the rivers, especially the Yangtze and the waterways of the Canton delta. Many of the warlords who struggled to gain control
of various provinces and districts during the 1916–28 revolutionary period used
China’s inland waterways for transportation, as military barriers, or as sources of
revenue—taxing the dense river and canal traffic. These efforts led to frequent
firefights between provincial forces and the imperialist gunboats that patrolled
China’s rivers and lakes, but most of these episodes were of no significance insofar as coherent maritime thinking or navy building by China was concerned.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/5
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There were two notable exceptions. First was a battle at the upper Yangtze
River port city of Wanhsien in September 1926. The local warlord, General Yang
Sen, had commandeered British-owned steamers to transport his troops; when
a British gunboat, HMS Cockchafer, attempted to free the steamers it ran into an
ambush, very capably managed by Yang, and suffered severe casualties.19 There
was also an October 1929 naval and land engagement on the Heilong (Amur)
River between Chinese and Soviet forces, one that foreshadowed the 1969 incident over disputed boundaries.20
Sea power was an effective “force multiplier” for the foreign powers present in
China, who used sea and river transport to move troops rapidly from crisis area
to crisis area.21 Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were thus able to influence the course of events in revolutionary China with relatively small military
forces. Republican China was unable to contest their maritime strength.
China’s record as a naval power during the long period of empire and republic
shows an understandable focus on the continental rather than maritime arena.
Navies were built and employed almost entirely for defensive purposes. Maritime
strength was regarded as a secondary element of national power.
The People’s Republic of China
The communist victory in 1949 was an army victory; the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was unable to project power across even the narrow Taiwan Strait.
The KMT navy continued raiding coastal installations, landing agents, attacking
merchant craft and fishing vessels, and threatening to invade the mainland. The
government in Beijing of the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) sought to
defend its coastline and island territories against both the United States and the
KMT regime on Taiwan. Coastal defense was emphasized in January 1950 with
the creation of a new East China Military Command, headquartered in Shanghai
and deploying more than 450,000 personnel. The East China Navy was formed
as part of this force.
The Early Years: 1949–1954
Beijing ordered these troops to defend China’s coast against “imperialist aggression from the sea,” continue the fight against Chiang’s forces, and help with
economic reconstruction.22 This first PRC navy was constituted largely by the defection of the KMT Second Coastal Defense Fleet.23 The new navy’s commander
said it was needed “to safeguard China’s independence, territorial integrity and
sovereignty against imperialist aggression[,] . . . to destroy the sea blockade of
liberated China, to support the land and air forces of the People’s Liberation
Army in defense of Chinese soil and to wipe out all remnants of the reactionary
forces.”24 A navy was also required to establish law and order on coastal and riverine waters, help the army capture offshore islands still occupied by the KMT,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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and prepare for the capture of Taiwan. The CCP Politburo further charged the
new navy with “defending both [eastern and southeastern] China coasts and the
Yangtze River.”25 General Zhang Aiping was the first commander (and political
commissar) of the navy. Among his first acts were the establishment of a naval
staff college at Nanjing and organization of a rudimentary maintenance and logistical infrastructure.
The PLAN was officially established in May 1950, under the command of
General Xiao Jinguang. The Chinese wanted a defensive force that would be inexpensive to build and could be quickly manned and trained.26 Zhang and Xiao
were typical of the early PLAN leadership—revolutionary officers who had spent
their entire careers as ground commanders and had been transferred to the navy
for reasons of political reliability and proven combat record rather than for any
particular naval experience.
Soviet Assistance. Mao Zedong, as chairman of the CCP’s Central Committee,
obtained financial assistance during a 1949–50 visit to Moscow; he planned to
use half the initial Soviet loan of $300 million to purchase naval equipment. The
new PLAN also ordered two new cruisers from Great Britain and attempted to
obtain surplus foreign warships through Hong Kong, efforts that were nullified
by the outbreak of the Korean War.27
China acquired mostly small vessels suitable to combat the coastal threat
from Taiwan, initially obtaining four old Soviet submarines, two destroyers, and
a large number of patrol boats. The new force also included about ten corvettes,
forty ex-U.S. landing craft, and several dozen miscellaneous river gunboats,
minesweepers, and yard craft, all seized from the KMT. The Soviets also helped
establish a large shore-based infrastructure, including shipyards, naval colleges,
and extensive coastal fortifications.28
Offshore Islands. Beijing’s goal was seizure of the offshore islands still occupied
by the KMT; the invasion of Taiwan was scheduled initially for the spring of 1950
but was soon postponed to the summer of 1951. Mao Zedong considered the
capture of Taiwan “an inseparable part of his great cause of unifying China.”29 He
lacked experience in naval warfare but quickly learned that a successful campaign
against Taiwan would require adequate amphibious training, naval transportation, “guaranteed air coverage,” and the cooperation of a “fifth column” on the
island—requirements that still apply.30
China achieved a major victory when in April 1950 the PLA occupied Hainan,
after Taiwan the largest island held by the Nationalists. The campaign cost Beijing
heavily in personnel losses but captured more than ninety thousand Nationalist
troops. This victory resulted from the PLA’s careful planning, its ability to neutralize superior Nationalist naval and air forces by use of shore-based artillery to gain
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/5
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effective control of the sea and airspace between Hainan and the mainland, and
the characteristically poor performance of Taiwan’s senior commanders.
The Korean War began two months later, and China’s fear of American aggression was heightened when in June 1950 President Harry Truman ordered
the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. This meant America’s reentry into
the Chinese civil war. Truman claimed that it was intended to prevent either side
from attacking the other; however, Beijing understood that the president was
committing the United States to the defense of Taiwan—after having refused to
do so for many months.31 Premier Zhou Enlai called Truman’s move “violent,
predatory action by the U.S. Government [that] constituted armed aggression
against the territory of China and total violation of the UN charter.”32 Beijing also
understood, as it does today, that the United States possessed complete air and sea
superiority in the western Pacific Ocean.
Beijing’s concern was reinforced in February 1953, when President Dwight
Eisenhower withdrew the U.S. fleet from the Taiwan Strait, thus in theory “unleashing” Nationalist forces on Taiwan to attack China.33 In December 1953,
Mao Zedong assigned the PLAN three priority missions: to eliminate KMT naval
interference and ensure safe navigation for China’s maritime commerce, prepare
to recover Taiwan, and oppose aggression from the sea.34
The PRC’s young navy faced many problems, including a lack of trained
personnel and of amphibious ships, as demonstrated in the very spotty record
of assaults on KMT-held coastal islands. Furthermore, in February 1952 Mao
diverted the navy’s ship-acquisition funds to the purchase of aircraft needed for
combat over Korea.35 Acquisition of equipment from foreign sources also was
constrained by Western refusal to sell arms to the PRC and by domestic budgetary limitations.
Furthermore, despite several visits to Moscow by senior PLA leaders, the Soviets continued to insist on immediate payment for their ships, although most of
them were obsolete.36 The PLAN also lacked airpower and was just beginning to
establish a capable maintenance and logistical infrastructure.
1955–1959
The Korean War provided China with mixed naval lessons. The amphibious
landing at Inchon in September 1950 was a major turning point of the war, while
United Nations command of the sea allowed free employment of aircraft carriers
and battleships to bombard North Korean and Chinese armies. The UN forces
suffered at least one significant maritime defeat, however, when a planned amphibious assault on the east-coast port of Hungnam in October 1950 had to be
canceled because the harbor had been mined. Overall, however, Korea was not a
maritime conflict, and the PLA ground forces’ dominant role there contributed
to a continued policy of limiting the navy to coastal defense.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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PLAN operations in the mid-1950s continued to focus on KMT attacks against
the mainland and on capturing islands still held by Taiwan. The 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis included the PLA’s capture of the Dachen Islands, an effort that
took advantage of superior airpower and a well-coordinated amphibious assault
against an outlying island.37
The navy’s First Aviation School was founded at Qingdao in October 1950,
and the navy’s air force, referred to as “the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air
Force,” or simply “naval aviation,” was formally established in 1952. Its mission
was support of antisurface and antisubmarine defensive operations. Its initial
inventory was eighty aircraft, including MiG-15 jet fighters, Il-28 jet bombers,
and propeller-driven Tu-2 strike aircraft. Naval aviation had grown to about 470
aircraft by 1958.38
PLAN operating forces were organized into the North Sea, East Sea, and South
Sea Fleets. The decade ended with the PRC in possession of all the disputed islands except Quemoy (Kinmen), Matsu (Mazu), the Pescadores (Penghus), and
of course Taiwan. The PLA also had defeated KMT raids on the mainland, as
well as attacks on merchant and fishing vessels.39 The PLAN had been organized,
sent to sea, and proven effective as a coastal-defense force within ten years of its
founding.
A New Situation: 1960–1976
The 1960s were marked by major foreign and domestic events that further constrained development of a seagoing navy. Most important was the split with the
Soviet Union, dramatically manifested in mid-1960 when Soviet advisers (and
their plans) were withdrawn from China. The navy suffered, with the rest of the
PLA, as military development projects were left in turmoil.
Other significant events in the early 1960s included war with India, the reemerging Vietnam conflict, turmoil in the new African states, and revolutionary movements throughout Southeast Asia. None of these major international
events directly involved the PLAN; they did not provide justification for naval
modernization, which was accordingly extremely limited. By the end of the
1960s, however, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated to the point of
armed conflict along the Amur River. The former ally was now the enemy; soon
the United States would be China’s ally. Beijing viewed the Soviet navy as a major
amphibious invasion threat. That navy deployed only weak amphibious forces in
its Pacific Fleet, but China was worried by a history of military threats from the
north, by Soviet proximity, and by the concentration of economic developments
in its own northeast.40
Significant naval developments were hampered also by the forced industrialization and collectivization program of 1958–61 known as the “Great Leap
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Forward,” and even more by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, lasting
from approximately 1966 to 1976. The PLAN continued to serve as an extension
of the army; modernization was limited, since prevailing PLA doctrine, that of
“People’s War,” portrayed technology and weaponry as insignificant compared
to the revolutionary fervor of soldiers imbued with Mao’s ideology. The Cultural
Revolution seriously hampered technological development in general; even the
relatively sacrosanct missile, submarine, and nuclear weapons programs were
affected.41 PLAN modernization was retarded by perhaps two decades as a result
of program restrictions and personnel losses that occurred during this political maelstrom. Except for the evolution of maritime nuclear power, the PLAN
missed or was very late joining developments that were common elsewhere
in most warfare areas, including the employment of guided missiles in antiair,
antisurface, and antisubmarine warfare; automation and computerization of
command and control; expanded use of shipborne helicopters; automation of
gunnery and sensor systems; and even the advent of automation and gas turbine
technology in ship propulsion.
PLAN modernization was hamstrung in the last years of the Cultural Revolution by the “Gang of Four.” Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing, led an attack on naval missile development. Another member of the clique, Zhang Chunqiao, expressed
its anti-navy, “continentalist” view.42 By 1970, however, despite this attitude and
a lack of resources for major conventional force development, the PLAN had
moved into the missile age, deploying a Soviet-designed ballistic-missile submarine and ten Soviet-built patrol boats armed with cruise missiles.
Despite the ideological turmoil of the late 1950s and the 1960s, Beijing was in
these years investing heavily in developing nuclear-armed missiles and nuclearpowered submarines to launch them. Beijing had relied on Soviet nuclear forces
to counter the American nuclear threat during the 1950s. Among the reasons
stresses in the alliance with Moscow had become more divisive as the 1960s
progressed was that Mao Zedong was determined that China develop its own
nuclear forces, proclaiming that “even if it takes 10,000 years, we must make a
nuclear submarine.”43 Mao was adamant that China should join the nuclear club.
These were national rather than PLAN projects, however, and did not significantly increase the navy’s ability to obtain the military resources necessary for
modernization.
The budgetary emphasis on nuclear weapons, the economic disruptions resulting from the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and
the continuing belief in Maoist orthodoxy all contributed to the Chinese navy’s
lack of resources for modernization during the late 1950s and the 1960s.
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After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
In May 1975, however, at a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC),
Mao Zedong reportedly directed the development of a modern navy, probably
reacting to both the Soviet threat and the development of a powerful navy by
China’s ancient adversary Japan. Chinese interests threatened by the Soviet navy
in the late 1970s and 1980s included SLOCs vital to Beijing’s rapidly increasing
merchant marine, as Moscow established a continual naval presence in the Indian
Ocean and the northern Arabian Sea. The Soviet Pacific Fleet almost doubled in
size during the 1970s and was upgraded by the assignment of Moscow’s latest
combatants, including nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed surface ships and
submarines. Soviet merchant ships and fishing vessels were also omnipresent in
Pacific waters historically vital to China’s economic interests.
Several factors continued to impede development of a large, modern Chinese
navy. The political aftershocks of the Cultural Revolution, as Hua Guofeng and
Deng Xiaoping contested for leadership of post-Mao China, limited the resources
devoted to military modernization. This struggle was not resolved until 1980,
when Deng emerged on top. However, Deng reemphasized the navy’s role as a
coastal-defense force, a view retained throughout the first half of the succeeding
decade. “Our navy,” Deng asserted, “should conduct coastal operations. It is a
defensive force. Everything in the construction of the navy must accord with this
guiding principle.”44
Naval growth also was limited by the disorder in China’s economic and social
structures that lasted beyond the end of the Cultural Revolution. This turmoil
affected China’s military-industrial complex, hindering modernization efforts in
the PLA generally. Furthermore, the lesson of the 1979 “punishment” of Vietnam
was sobering to the PLA, but this conflict did not involve significant naval efforts.
Hence, the PLAN probably benefited only marginally from corrective budgetary
measures that resulted.
Finally, the triangular play among China, the Soviet Union, and the United
States meant that by 1980 Beijing could rely on the world’s largest and most
modern navy to counter the Soviet maritime threat. This argued against China’s
developing a similar force of its own. Furthermore, given the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, Beijing could subsume concern about future Japanese aggression
within its strategic relationship with Washington.45
Major changes in China’s domestic and international situation in the 1980s
soon altered Beijing’s view of the PLAN, and maritime power became a more
important instrument of national security strategy by the end of the decade.
Beijing’s second maritime priority, after countering the Soviet threat, was securing offshore territorial claims. Taiwan was the most important of these, but the
South China Sea was also significant. Although successful action against South
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/5
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Vietnamese naval forces in 1974 resulted in Chinese possession of the disputed
Paracel Islands, the fight itself indicated that other claimants to the islands and
reefs of the South China Sea would not accede meekly to Beijing’s territorial assertions. Furthermore, the Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay was flourishing as
the 1970s ended.
These factors contributed to a significant change in the South Sea Fleet’s organization: the marine corps, first formed in 1953 but disbanded in 1957, was
reestablished in December 1979 as an amphibious assault force and assigned to
the southern fleet. The PLAN’s slender amphibious assets were concentrated in
the South Sea Fleet, which conducted “island seizing” exercises. In 1980, for instance, a major fleet exercise in the South China Sea focused on the seizure and
defense of islands in the Paracel Archipelago.46
The South Sea Fleet’s organization benefited from PLAN force-structure
changes that, for the first time, centered on Chinese-built warships. Although
still heavily reliant on Soviet designs, the Luda-class guided-missile destroyers,
Jianghu-class frigates, and Houjian fast attack missile boats collectively marked a
significant increase in China’s maritime capability. The submarine force included
the first Chinese-built nuclear-powered attack submarines, as well as about sixty
conventionally powered boats. A seaborne nuclear deterrent force continued
under development, following Mao’s earlier declaration that the navy had to be
built up “to make it dreadful to the enemy.”47
Deng Xiaoping’s Navy
Naval expansion and modernization were spurred during the 1980s by the coastal
concentration of China’s burgeoning economy and military facilities. Furthermore, the resources necessary for a modernized PLAN became available as a result of China’s dramatic economic development and increasing wealth. Recovery
from the Cultural Revolution, well under way by 1985, brought a reinvigorated,
if less centralized, military-industrial complex.
Three events contributed prominently to the development of the navy in this
decade. The first was Deng’s evaluation of the military at an expanded CMC
meeting in 1975 as “overstaffed, lazy, arrogant, ill equipped, and ill prepared
to conduct modern warfare,” an opinion strengthened by the PLA’s poor performance during the 1979 conflict with Vietnam.48 Second was Beijing’s 1985
strategic decision that the Soviet Union no longer posed a major threat to China
in terms of global nuclear war and that accordingly the PLA would have to be
prepared instead for “small wars on the periphery” of the nation.49 The emphasis
on a “peripheral” (to a significant extent maritime) rather than continental strategic view improved the PLAN’s leverage in obtaining resources within the PLA
as a whole.
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Third was the rise to prominence of Admiral Liu Huaqing. Liu had been
schooled in the Soviet Union, had served most of his career in the science and
technology arms of the PLA, and was close to Deng Xiaoping.50 Liu exerted a
strong force on development of the navy as its commander from 1982 to 1987
and vice chairman of the CMC until 1997. He is best known for promulgating a
three-stage maritime strategy that provided justification on which PLAN officers
and other navalists could base their plans for a larger, more modern navy. More
important were his accomplishments in reorganizing the navy, redeveloping the
marine corps, upgrading bases and research-and-development facilities, and
restructuring the school and training systems.51
China’s widening maritime concerns and increased budget resources in the
1980s favored PLAN modernization, which proceeded along three paths—
indigenous construction, foreign purchase, and reverse engineering—much as
had Li Hongzhang’s “self-strengthening” navy initiative of a hundred years earlier. The 1980s program proceeded at a measured pace, but it created a new navy.
Construction included guided-missile destroyers and frigates, replenishmentat-sea ships, conventionally and nuclear-powered attack submarines, and support
craft, including missile-tracking ships and officer-training vessels. Foreign purchases were concentrated in the West, with the United States selling China a small
number of modern ship engines and torpedoes and Western European nations
selling weapons and sensor systems, including Italian torpedoes, French cruise
missiles, and British radars. The PLAN acquired its only Xia-class fleet-ballisticmissile submarine. The successful submerged launch in 1988 of the Ju Lang–1
(JL-1) intermediate-range ballistic missile from this submarine meant that China
for the first time could deploy strategic nuclear weapons at sea.52
The PLAN demonstrated its increasing capability in other maritime missions
as well during the 1980s. China invested in four large space-surveillance ships
to support its growing military and commercial space program; these ships conducted the first long-range PLAN deployments, in support of space launches, in
1980. Task forces supported scientific expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic.
The PLAN’s first foreign port visit was conducted in 1985, when two East Sea
Fleet ships visited Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan; the officer-training ship
Zheng He became the first PLAN vessel to visit the United States when it made a
1989 port call in Hawaii.
During the 1990s Beijing continued to expand and modernize the navy it had
begun building in the 1970s, but again, at a measured pace. The PLAN engaged
in a series of long-range deployments throughout East and South Asia, as well
as deploying a three-ship task group to the Western Hemisphere in 1998, visiting the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. Foreign purchases of improved
ships, submarines, and aircraft earned the PLAN headlines as China acquired
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/5
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Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, and Su-27
fighters from Russia, but these constituted only incremental improvements to a
large if still limited navy.
Notable Consistencies and Cautionary Messages
The communist regime recognized early on the need to deal with maritime issues, but only after thirty years and a dramatically altered international situation
did China apparently acknowledge the necessity of a modernized navy. Beijing
currently views “the ocean as its chief strategic defensive direction,” since “China’s
political and economic focus lies on the coastal areas [and] for the present and a
fairly long period to come, [its] strategic focus will be in the direction of the sea.”53
The Chinese navy being built for the twenty-first century owes a good deal to
its history, which has been marked by some notable consistencies. First has been
recognition of the maritime element in China’s national security. Second, Chinese naval efforts have been closely linked to the nation’s economic development.
Hence, continued naval modernization should be expected, in view of China’s
continuing economic boom.
Third, Chinese naval development since the eighteenth century has been
marked by significant interaction with foreign navies. Qing-dynasty modernization efforts drew on Japanese, German, British, and American naval professionals as advisers, administrators, and engineers. This trend continued under the
People’s Republic of China, with a sporadic but pervasive reliance on Soviet/
Russian advisers, strategy, equipment, technology, and engineers.
Fourth, the Chinese government has not hesitated to employ naval force in
pursuit of national security goals. These efforts have not always been successful
(witness the failed campaigns in 1884 against France and 1894–95 against Japan)
but often they have been, as in 1950, 1954–55, and 1958 in the Taiwan Strait, and
in 1974, 1988, and 1998 in the South China Sea. Beijing’s willingness to resort to
naval force even when significantly outgunned bears a cautionary message for
foreign strategists.
Imperial China for the most part ignored the sea except for brief periods and
specific campaigns. Republican China was simply too preoccupied with civil war
and Japanese invasion to focus on naval development. The communist regime
installed in 1949 maintained for almost fifty years a traditional Chinese attitude
toward the navy as a secondary instrument of national power.
Mao Zedong recognized in 1950 that deploying a navy to conquer Taiwan
required development of expertise in amphibious warfare, seaborne logistics, and
maritime airpower, but his plan to organize a strong navy was aborted because of
the Korean War and thereafter limited by domestic political events, especially the
disastrous Great Leap Forward. Later, naval development was severely impacted
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during the 1960s by the Sino-Soviet split and the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution. Only at the end of the 1970s, following the end of the Cultural Revolution and the post-Mao power struggle, was the PLAN in a position to “take off.”
That takeoff did not immediately happen, although the PLAN did benefit in
the 1980s from a relatively close relationship with the United States, from which
China purchased advanced naval systems, including LM2500 gas-turbine engines
and Mark 46 antisubmarine torpedoes. The sanctions that followed the June 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre ended U.S. naval assistance, and China has since
turned to Europe, Israel, and especially Russia. The following decades have seen
a dramatic increase in China’s naval capabilities.
Almost all of China’s primary sovereignty concerns lie in the maritime arena:
Taiwan; territorial and seabed resource disputes with Japan in the East China
Sea; similar disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the South China Sea; and SLOCs across the Indian Ocean endangered
by piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the government’s authority relies in
significant part on continued economic growth, which in turn relies on maritime
trade and energy flows.
Finally, Beijing’s willingness to resort to force even when significantly outgunned should impart a cautionary message for strategists considering possible
Chinese reactions to specific issues, especially Taiwan’s efforts to resist reunification. While Beijing will continue to be constrained by American (and perhaps
Japanese) naval force, it will not hesitate to employ the PLAN in situations involving sovereignty or other vital national security claims.
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